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Abstract 
The short-time compensation (STC) program aims at avoiding redundancies in case of strong short-term downturns. 
In the literature, STC is an instrument of both job security and flexibility. This paper investigates the impact of 
worksharing on STC in France. The form of worksharing examined in this study is the reduction of the standard or 
contractual hours worked per week to 35 hours in France. We quantify the average decrease in the STC recourse with 
difference-in-differences estimators assessed on a balanced panel of French establishments. We highlight a substitution 
effect between STC and worksharing due to their internal flexibility role. As a consequence, STC seems to be less 
used as a flexibility device and the worksharing policy would refocus STC on its employment protection role.
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1. Introduction 
 
The short-time compensation (STC) program is a device of employment protection 
since it aims at avoiding layoffs in the case of short-term economic downturns or exceptional 
circumstances (for instance, disasters). Employers applying STC can temporarily reduce their 
employees’ activity below the legal working time or eliminate a part of their total activity. 
STC allows employees to maintain a contractual bond with their employer. They receive a 
compensation for their wage loss that is partly paid by the State. Most developed countries 
use some form of an STC program: the “Chômage Partiel” in France, the “Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni” in Italy, the “Kurzarbeitergeld” in Germany, and the “Short-Time Compensation 
Program” in the United States. STC programs are relatively new and are underutilized in 
North America, but they have been widespread since the 1920s in Europe. Nevertheless, STC 
is rarely used in all countries. For example, less than 1% of establishments and 2% of their 
employees use STC in France (Calavrezo et al., 2008). In the 1980s, there was a similar, low 
STC participation, limited to less than 1% of employers in the United States (Needels et al., 
1997). 
Among the previously mentioned STC programs, in this paper, we focus on the French 
STC program between 1995 and 2005. The main feature of STC in France is that its use 
strongly decreased during the period under study (cf. Figure 1). What are the determinants of 
this  important  fall?  Since  the  main  purpose  of  STC  is  to  help  firms  facing  short-term 
economic downturns, the use of STC generally increases during economic downturns and 
decreases during economic upturns. Yet, since the end of the 1990s, the relation between STC 
and the economic situation has relaxed (see Figures 1 and 2). This coincides with the period 
of  implementation  of  the  worksharing  policy
1.  Does  this  mean  that  worksharing  is  a 
determinant of the STC decrease between 1995 and 2005? Worksharing represents a complex 
policy that was progressively implemented between 1996 and 2005 in France (see Askenazy 
(2008) for a description of worksharing in France and Kapteyn et al. (2004) for worksharing 
in Europe). The form of worksharing examined in this paper is the reduction of the standard 
or contractual hours worked per week to 35 hours in France, often referred to as “shorter 
hours.” Within French establishments, methods and periods of worksharing implementation 
are very heterogeneous. The legal workweek duration was reduced to 35 hours from January 
1, 2000 for firms with more than 20 employees and from January 1, 2002 for firms with 20 
employees or less. There is a fundamental difference between legal workweek duration and 
effective  workweek  duration.  In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  the  reduction  of  the  effective 
workweek  duration.  After  changing  the  legal  workweek  duration  to  35  hours,  some 
establishments  still  kept  their  effective  working  time  duration  higher  than  the  legal  one, 
preferring to pay for overtime. Other establishments anticipated the changing of the legal 
workweek duration: they reduced their effective workweek duration before the reduction of 
standard worked hours per week. What is the motivation for an establishment to anticipate the 
implementation  of  the  worksharing  policy?  By  reducing  the  effective  workweek  duration 
before the worksharing implementation, they receive a financial compensation. In this paper, 
we focus exclusively on the anticipated reduction of workweek duration, which we henceforth 
refer to as worksharing.  
Our work analyzes the role of worksharing in the decrease of STC use. Even if the 
main objective of STC is to protect employment, the economic literature also identifies a 
flexibility role (Burdett and Wright, 1989; Abraham and Houseman, 1994; Van Audenrode, 
1994); it is important to mention that these two roles coexist. STC and worksharing are two 
similar internal quantitative flexibility devices, as they act on the volume of hours worked by 
                                                 
1 In France, worksharing is called “35 hours.”   2 
the employees of the establishment. We have observed that firms in France use STC in two 
different ways: a “cyclical flexibility” use and a “structural flexibility” use. The “cyclical 
flexibility”  use  is  the  adjustment  of  working  hours  to  the  activity  through  STC  when 
establishments  use  STC  in  a  non-recurrent  way.  The  “structural  flexibility”  use  is  the 
adjustment of working hours to the activity through repeated STC episodes. The second type 
of STC is contrary to  French law, but it is authorized for some large firms belonging to 
particular  industries  (automobile  and  clothing).  Worksharing  provides  establishments  with 
more flexibility, and as a consequence, STC legislation was reformed in France. The aim of 
the reform was to diminish the use of STC, because firms could use it improperly. The idea 
was to refocus STC on its employment protection role. In order to estimate the effect of 
worksharing on STC, difference-in-differences (DD) models were tested on a balanced panel 
of 1,100 French establishments belonging to firms with at least 50 employees. The final panel 
was  obtained  by  matching  seven  datasets.  We  highlight  a  decrease  in  STC  use  after  the 
implementation of worksharing, due to the role of internal flexibility tools. Hence, globally, 
STC seems to be used less as a flexibility tool and more as an employment protection tool. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, and section 3 
presents the econometric strategy. The evolution of STC is presented in section 4. Results are 
discussed in section 5, while section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data Sources 
 
In order to assess the effect of worksharing on STC, we used an original and rich 
statistical dataset obtained by matching seven data sources
2. 
When facing a short-term economic downturn, an employer can ask for a number of 
STC days. If the request is justifiable, the French administration authorizes the use of STC, 
and  these  authorizations  are  stored  in  a  monthly  STC  database.  This  database  contains 
information about STC authorizations obtained by French establishments between 1995 and 
2005. The authorized STC imperfectly measures the compensated STC that establishments 
really use and for which they receive a financial compensation. Indeed, some establishments 
can decide not to use STC-authorized days. In the database, the number of compensated days 
is not available at the establishment or firm level. Thus, we measured the number of STC-
authorized days. This is the upper limit of the compensated days and represents an indicator 
of employers’ anticipations. From these databases, we constituted an exhaustive STC panel. It 
covers more than 93,000 French establishments in all industries that had at least one STC 
authorization between 1995 and 2005. This panel provides yearly information on the number 
of  STC-authorized  days  and  STC  employees  for  each  establishment.  We  also  identified 
establishments  that  had  multiple  STC  uses  between  1995  and  2005.  Such  a  variable  can 
capture  recurrent  STC  use  for  structural  downturn  situations.  We  also  recorded 
establishments’ industry and geographic location variables.  
The  "Worksharing"  database  contains  the  declarations  and  agreements  of 
establishments that reduced their effective working time in order to benefit from the social 
security exemption. We constructed a variable that equals 1 if an establishment reduced its 
effective  workweek  duration  before  the  worksharing  implementation  and  0  if  an 
establishment did not reduce its effective workweek duration at all. Establishments that are 
not in the “Worksharing” database may be absent for two reasons: they did not reduce their 
effective workweek duration, or they reduced their workweek duration, but without asking for 
social security exemption. Thus, it is difficult to correctly identify establishments that did not 
reduce  their  effective  workweek  duration.  In  order  to  identify  them,  we  focused  on 
                                                 
2 They are produced by the  Statistical Department of the French  Labor Ministry (DARES) and the French 
National Institute of Statistics (INSEE).   3 
establishments belonging to firms with at least 50 employees. In contrast to small firms, firms 
with  at  least  50  employees  have  a  low  probability  of  reducing  their  effective  workweek 
duration without asking for social security exemption.  
Establishment files (UNEDIC) are annual exhaustive administrative sources relating to 
establishments affiliated with the unemployment insurance system. They  cover the period 
from 1995 to 2003. These files contain information regarding the total number of employees 
and the percentage of women, and they allow us to identify survivor establishments over the 
period.  We  worked  on  a  balanced  panel.  This  condition  represents  our  second  matching 
criterion.  This  control  is  necessary,  because  it  neutralizes  the  effects  of  establishments’ 
creation/destruction  associated  with  the  economic  situation,  which  may  strongly  bias  our 
results. 
Additional information about the firms to which establishments belong was obtained 
from  four  firm  databases.  First,  we  used  a  firm  fiscal  database  (the  “Bénéfices  Réels 
Normaux” (BRN) file),  which covers the period from 1994 to 2003. We calculated three 
indicators of economic health: the value-added variation rate, the profitability rate and the 
apparent labor productivity ratio. We also calculated two workforce structure indicators: the 
share of temporary workers and the share of subcontracting expenses. By comparing the size 
of the establishment to the size of the firm to which it belongs, we constructed a variable 
indicating whether the firm is a mono-establishment firm. Second, we used a database that 
provides firms’ labor contracts (ACEMO files from 1994 to 2004). We calculated the share of 
fixed-term contracts in each firm. Third, firms’ financial group memberships were given by 
the LIFI databases. Finally, the MDST databases indicate whether a firm was restructured 
between 1994 and 2004.  
After  matching  these  data  sources  and  eliminating  establishments  with  missing 
information and agricultural establishments, we worked on a balanced panel of approximately 
1,100 French establishments.
3 This final sample includes survivor establishments belonging to 
firms with at least 50 employees that had at least one STC authorization.  
 
3. Econometric Model 
 
Worksharing is not randomly distributed among French establishments. The decision 
to implement worksharing may be related to the internal labor force management strategy of 
the establishment. This raises the selection bias methodological problem. There is also an 
unobserved  heterogeneity  bias  problem,  since  unobserved  heterogeneity  is  likely  to  be 
correlated  with  STC  behavior.  Simple  estimation  methods  do  not  produce  consistent 
estimators.  In  order  to  control  for  these  two  biases,  we  implemented  basic  difference-in-
differences (DD) models.  
This method is largely used in economics for policy evaluation. As Wooldridge (2007) 
explained, outcomes are observed for two groups and for two time periods. One of the groups 
is exposed to a treatment (worksharing) in the second period, but not in the first period. The 
second group is not exposed to the treatment during either period. In the case in which the 
same units within a group are observed in each time period (panel data), the average gain in 
the second (control) group is subtracted from the average gain in the first (treatment) group. 
This removes biases in second period comparisons between the treatment and control groups 
that could be the result of permanent differences between those groups, as well as biases from 
comparisons over time in the treatment group that could be the result of trends. The equation 
of estimation can be written as follows:  
0 1 2 0 1 _ STC ind X WS I WS I u b b b d d = + + + + ´ +                      (1) 
                                                 
3 The sample size is described more precisely in section 3.     4 
_ STC ind  is the outcome of interest. Several dimensions of the STC recourse can be 
affected  by  worksharing.  To  quantify  the  evolution  of  the  STC  recourse,  we  used  two 
categories  of  indicators:  { } _ _ , _ Î STC ind STC days STC empl .  The  _ STC days   variable 
represents the total number of STC days within a year covering employees affected by STC 
within the establishment (continuous variable). The  _ STC emp  variable represents the total 
number of establishment employees affected by STC within a year (continuous variable).  
Concerning the worksharing indicator,  WS  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if an 
establishment  reduced  its  effective  workweek  duration  before  the  worksharing 
implementation and 0 if an establishment did not reduce its effective workweek duration. As 
we  worked  with  establishments  belonging  to  firms  with  at  least  50  employees,  the 
worksharing  was  implemented  on  January  1,  2000  (cf.  Section  1).  As  the  variable  WS  
captures  whether  the  establishment  reduced  its  effective  workweek  duration  before  the 
worksharing implementation, this can only account for changes that took place before 2000. 
In the “Worksharing” data source, after the matching, the majority of establishments reduced 
the effective workweek duration in 1998 and 1999.
4 Thus, WS equals 1 if the establishment 
reduced  its  effective  workweek  duration  in  1998  or  in  1999.  The  dummy  WS   captures 
possible differences between the treatment and control groups prior to the policy change.  
X  is a matrix of covariates that can control for compositional changes. We took into 
account three types of covariates: standard characteristics, economic health indicators and 
workforce  structure  indicators.  These  variables  are  fundamental  when  describing  STC 
behavior  in  France.  The  following  variables  are  standard  establishment 
characteristics: _ it Est size  is a continuous variable that indicates the number of employees of 
the  establishment;  the  establishment  industry  is  captured  by  three  dummy  variables 
(manufacturing,  services  and  construction);  the  establishment  region  is  captured  by  eight 
dummy  variables  (eight  aggregated  geographic  regions  of  France);  it Group   is  a  dummy 
variable that indicates whether the establishment belongs to a financial group;  it Restruct  is a 
dummy  variable  that  indicates  whether  the  firm  to  which  the  establishment  belongs  was 
restructured between 1996 and 2004;  _ Mono est  is a dummy variable that indicates whether 
the  firm  to  which  the  establishment  belongs  is  a  single-establishment  firm  or  a  multi-
establishment firm;  _ Multi STC  is a dummy variable that indicates whether an establishment 
used STC at least twice between 1995 and 2005 . We used three indicators of the economic 
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= ). For these three variables, we worked with their values lagged by one 
year. Concerning the workforce structure indicators, we used the following variables:  % it TW  
is the share of temporary workers out of the total number of employees;  % it Subcontr  is the 
ratio of subcontracting expenses on the value added;  % it FTC  is the share of a firm’s fixed-
                                                 
4 Due to the very low number of establishments that reduced their effective workweek duration in 1996 or 1997, 
we decided to eliminate this category.   5 
term contracts in the total number of employees and % it Women  is the share of women out of 
the total number of employees.  
The dummy  I  captures aggregated factors that would cause changes in  _ STC ind  
even in the absence of a policy change. The coefficient of interest is  1 d  for the crossed effect 
of worksharing and I . The difference-in-differences estimate is: 
1 ˆ
T,2 T,1 C,2 C,1 =(STC_ind -STC_ind )-(STC_ind -STC_ind ) d         (2) 
where T  indexes the treated group and C  the control group, and 2 indexes the second period 
and 1 the first period.  
Worksharing  effects  can  vary  with  time.  By  using  the  panel  dimension,  we  can 
evaluate the impact of worksharing between different points in time. We chose two years for 
the first period (1996 and 1997) and four years for the second period (2000 to 2003). As we 
had two STC outcomes, we finally estimated 16 different models. For each establishment, we 
fixed the values of the covariates at the beginning of the first period. According to this choice, 
the final sample contains 1,163 establishments for 1996 and 1,146 establishments for 1997.
5 
 
4. Evolution of STC between 1995 and 2005 
 
[Insert figure 1] 
In  this  section,  we  use  descriptive  statistics  to  analyze  the  possible  effect  of 
worksharing  on  STC  use.  Figure  1  shows  the  evolution  of  STC  between  1995  and  2005 
through three measures: the number of STC days (on the left scale), the number of STC 
employees (on the left scale) and the number of STC establishments (on the right scale).
6 STC 
strongly decreased for the three measures. Between 1996 and 2005, the number of STC days 
decreased six-fold, and the number of STC employees decreased from 1.7 million to 300,000 
(an 82% decrease). Concerning the number of STC establishments, the decrease reached 85%, 
diminishing from 34,000 establishments to 5,000. At the end of the 1990s, the fall may be 
mainly related to the economic situation (a period of fast economic growth). After 2001, the 
year of an economic reversal, the increase in STC use is not massive. Does the economic 
situation  entirely  explain  the  downward  trend  of  STC  after  2001?  We  suppose  that 
establishments became less interested in STC, due to the worksharing implementation. 
 
[Insert figure 2] 
Figure 2 presents the connection between the economic situation and STC use over the 
last decade by illustrating two monthly series: the entrepreneurial opinion in manufacturing 
(on the left scale) and the number of STC days in manufacturing (on the right scale).
7 This 
figure highlights the good adjustment between the business cycle and STC between 1995 and 
1998.  It  also  shows  a  weak  disconnection  in  1998  that  coincides  with  the  time  of 
implementation of one of the worksharing laws and a strong disconnection when the legal 
work duration was obligatorily reduced for firms with more than 20 employees (in 2000). 




[Insert table 1] 
                                                 
5 This is due to a different number of missing values for covariates for 1996 and 1997.  
6  For  a  complete  description  of  STC  between  1995  and  2005  in  France,  see  Calavrezo,  Duhautois  and 
Walkowiak, 2008.  
7 STC establishments are mainly found in the manufacturing industry in France (80% of cases).    6 
Table  1  gives  the  difference-in-differences  estimates  performed  on  the  sample 
described in section 2. It summarizes the results of 16 regressions on STC indicators and 
exclusively reports the coefficient  1 ˆ d  (see section 3). The comparison between establishments 
that  did  not  reduce  their  workweek  duration  and  establishments  that  implemented 
worksharing  gave  stable  results  (regardless  of  the  outcome  measure  and  the  year  of 
reference). Establishments that reduced their workweek duration significantly decreased their 
STC use, as compared with establishments that did not reduce their workweek duration in 
terms of STC days and number of STC employees. For instance, the use of STC decreased by 
760 days and 41 employees per establishment between 1996 and 2000 and by 624 days and 
39 employees per establishment between 1996 and 2003 (see Table 1). For a comparison 
between 1996 and 2000, as the sample covers 528 establishments that reduced their working 
time with an average decrease per establishment of 759 STC days, this would mean that 
worksharing “would explain” a decrease of about 401,000 STC days between 1996 and 2000. 
As  in  this  sample, the  total  decrease  in  STC  days  was  more  than  one  million  STC  days 
between 1996 and 2000, we can “explain” 37% of this decrease as a worksharing effect. The 
remaining  change  is  probably  due  to  the  other  major  determinant  of  STC,  the  economic 
situation. Consequently, at a macroeconomic level, this gives us an idea about the strong 
decrease of the STC recourse, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Table 1 also shows that, in terms of the number of STC employees, there is not a very 
significant difference between the average decreases when the year of the second period goes 
from 2000 to 2003. This means that worksharing led to a strong decrease in the number of 
STC employees, but this number seemed to remain stable between 2000 and 2003, although 
the economic situation deteriorated after 2000.
8 However, in terms of STC days, the situation 
is different: firms used less STC days after worksharing, and the indicator “number of STC 
days” followed the economic situation. These two results show that there may still be some 
establishments  that  continued  to  use  STC  in  a  recurrent  way  after  the  implementation  of 
worksharing, but for shorter durations. STC continues being a “structural flexibility” device 
for these establishments (see section 1).   
In  order  to  generalize  and  test  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we  performed  three 
additional estimations, and we also implemented a validity test for the DD models. In the first 
additional test, 1997 was taken as a year of reference (see Table 1). The results are similar to 
those  obtained  for  1996.  For  instance,  the  use  of  STC  decreased  by  404  days  and  33 
employees between 1997 and 2000. Nevertheless, the decrease in the STC indicators is less 
important than for 1996, for which absolute values are more important for STC days and 
employees. This is due to the fact that 1996 was a very unusual year: it corresponds to the 
year with the worst economic situation from 1995-2005 and with the highest level of STC use 
(Figure 1).  
 
[Insert table 2] 
For  the  second  additional  test,  we  performed  DD  estimations  on  a  subsample  of 
recurrent STC establishments.
9 The distinction between the two samples was made regarding 
the frequency of STC use. Between 1995 and 2005, there were establishments that used STC 
several times. We defined a recurrent STC establishment as an establishment that used STC at 
least  twice  between  1995  and  2005.  Normally,  STC  must  be  used  only  in  exceptional 
circumstances; in other words, STC must be used rarely. A recurrent STC use can hide an 
improper use of the device in the eyes of the law. This distinction emphasizes the ambiguity 
                                                 
8 2000 was a very good year in terms of the economic situation in France.  
9 When the first period is 1996, the subsample contains 615 establishments, and when it is 1997, the subsample 
contains 584 establishments.    7 
regarding STC use: the exceptional and non-repetitive conditions of STC recourse stated in 
the law are overstepped for some establishments and even for entire industries (automobile, 
clothing).  We  think  that  for  recurrent  STC  establishments,  the  device  is  not  used  in 
exceptional  situations  but  rather  that  it  is  probably  used  as  an  “ordinary”  flexibility 
instrument. Table 2 shows the results of the DD estimations for the recurring sample for the 
two  categories  of  STC  variables.  The  results  are  similar,  but  the  effects  are  much  more 
important  in  absolute  value,  as  compared  with  the  global  sample.  For  example,  for  the 
recurrent sample, worksharing led to a decrease of more than 1,293 STC days and of 67 
employees  per  establishment  between  1996  and  2000.  We  once  again  find  the  same 
comparable decrease in STC employees between 2000 and 2003, but a decrease followed the 
economic situation for the STC days indicator. It seems that recurrent STC establishments are 
even more likely to use STC as a “structural flexibility” device. 
  For a third additional check, we implemented another evaluation method: we tested 
evaluation models with kernel matching estimators. This model gives comparable measures 
for STC reduction after worksharing implementation and proves the robustness of our results.  
 
[Insert figure 3] 
Finally,  in  order  to  verify  the  “common  trend  assumption”  hypothesis  of  the  DD 
implementation, Figure 3 illustrates the STC-authorized days index for establishments that 
reduced their effective workweek duration before the worksharing implementation ( 1 WS = ) 
and for those that did not reduce their effective workweek duration at all ( 0 WS = ). Until 
1998 (before the implementation of worksharing), we observe that the two indices vary in a 
similar  way.  In  1998  and  1999,  there  was  an  important  breakdown,  probably  due  to 
worksharing. After the worksharing implementation, we notice that the STC level is always 
lower for establishments that implemented worksharing.  
In conclusion, the DD estimates show that worksharing leads to a decrease in STC 
days  and  employees:  a  quasi-constant  decrease  in  terms  of  employees  and  a  decrease 
following the economic situation for the STC days. Globally, it seems that worksharing would 
have progressively covered the needs in terms of flexibility (cyclical or structural) for which 
STC responded before its implementation. For establishments in which STC has a “cyclical 
flexibility”  role,  worksharing  decreases  the  number  of  establishments  using  the  device. 
Nevertheless,  for  establishments  in  which  STC  plays  a  “structural  flexibility”  role,  the 
“substitution” between worksharing and STC was made through less important durations of 
STC (the STC days indicator), but the establishments continue using STC for their employees 
in  a  recurrent  way.  Thus,  globally,  worksharing  seems  to  focus  STC  on  its  main  role  of 
employment protection.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
STC  can  be  seen  as  a  tool  for  both  flexibility  and  employment  protection. 
Worksharing is a device with an initial objective of reducing unemployment. The French 
worksharing implementation represents a flexibility tool because firms can use worked hours 
differently. The STC reform of 2001 is directly related to the worksharing implementation. 
Establishments  have  had  to  prioritize  the  use  of  flexible  working  hours  associated  with 
worksharing. Our results show a “substitution effect” between worksharing and STC from 
1996-2003.  By  using  difference-in-differences  estimators  on  a  balanced  panel  of 
establishments, we quantified the average decrease in STC. Indeed, the flexibility role of STC 
seems to have collapsed. Until 2000, STC was inversely correlated to the economic situation, 
and after 2000, firms could no longer use STC as an internal flexibility tool. This suggests 
that, globally, worksharing has refocused STC on its main role, protecting employment.    8 
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Source: Annual STC authorization panel obtained from monthly STC authorization databases covering the period 1995-2005 (the Statistical 
Department of the French Ministry of Labor and the Departmental Directions of Work and Employment). 
Field: More than 93,000 French establishments with STC authorizations (all sizes and all industries).   10 











































Entrepreneurial opinion in manufacturing STC authorized days in manufacturing
 
Source: Monthly survey of the economic situation (the French National Institute of Statistics) and monthly STC authorization databases (the 
Statistical Department of the French Ministry of Labor and the Departmental Directions of Work and Employment). 
Field: Manufacturing. 
Note: The left scale is reversed so that the high portion of the figure indicates a degraded economic situation and the low portion indicates a 
good economic situation.    11 






1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Establishments that anticipated worksharing
Establishments without worksharing implementation
Source: Panel data obtained by merging seven databases. The STC-authorized days index is calculated using 1995 as the base year. 
Field: More than 1,100 survivor establishments between 1995 and 2003 that belong to firms with at least 50 employees (all sizes and all 
industries). 
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Table 1: Difference-in-differences estimates 
Year of reference 1996  Year of reference 1997 
Year of the  
second period 
STC_days  STC_empl  Year of the  
second period 
STC_days  STC_empl 
2000  -759.46 ***  -40.55 ***  2000  -403.87 ***  -32.82 *** 
2001  -745.98 ***  -37.30 ***  2001  -380.96 **  -29.73 *** 
2002  -600.04 ***  -33.37 ***  2002  -247.64 *  -27.44 *** 
2003  -624.28 ***  -38.94 ***  2003  -275.80 *  -31.54 *** 
Source: Panel data obtained by merging seven databases.  
Field: More than 1,100 survivor establishments between 1995 and 2003 that belong to firms with at least 50 employees (all sizes and all 
industries,  except  for  agriculture).  When  the  first  period  is  1996,  the  sample  has  1,163  establishments,  of  which  528  implemented 
worksharing  and 635 did not  reduce  the  effective  working  time  duration.  When  the  year  of  reference  is  1997, the  sample  has 1,146 
establishments, of which 520 reduced the effective working time duration and 626 did not reduce working time.  
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Table 2: Difference-in-differences estimates - recurrent subsample 
Year of reference 1996  Year of reference 1997 
Year of the  
second period 
STC_days  STC_empl  Year of the  
second period 
STC_days  STC_empl 
2000  -1292.74 ***  -67.27 ***  2000  -645.76 ***  -56.19 *** 
2001  -1287.34 ***  -58.44 ***  2001  -643.76 **  -47.27 *** 
2002  -1049.14 ***  -60.61 ***  2002  -416.42 *  -52.36 *** 
2003  -1080.86 ***  -66.22 ***  2003  -463.18 *  -55.81 *** 
Source: Panel data obtained by merging seven databases.  
Field: More than 500 survivor establishments between 1995 and 2003 that belong to STC recurrent firms with at least 50 employees (all sizes 
and all industries, except for agriculture). When the first period is 1996, we have 615 establishments, of which 296 implemented worksharing 
and 319 did not reduce their effective working time duration. When the year of reference is 1997, we have 584 establishments, of which 283 
reduced the effective working time duration and 301 did not reduce working time. 
 
 
 
 
 